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The notion of social responsibility across different types of 
nonprofit and for profit organizations 
 
 
Abstract 
This contribution focuses on forms of CSR of the likes of NPOs, social enterprises, co-
operative firms, employee-owned companies (EOCs) and multi-stakeholder governance. 
Their common feature is that they all are organizational types which do not maximise profits, 
and add the social dimension in the operation and aims of the organization as fundamental 
elements. The explicit recognition of a social dimension can therefore be studied at different 
levels, starting from basic institutions, such as control rights and governance, up to strategic 
and operational dimensions such as organizational routines, managerial models and 
employment relations. The issue to be examined, in these respects, is how these firms design 
their governance consistently with the instrumental role of profit and other commercial 
objectives, and how the role of profit is reconciled with the main societal aims. 
 
Key words: social responsibility; governance; welfare; co-operative enterprises; employee 
owned companies; non-profit organizations; social enterprises. 
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Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be 
observed in organisational forms that do not pursue commercial objectives in an exclusive or 
dominant way or, in other words, organisations that explicitly shape their aim and structure in 
terms of social responsibility. 
The concept of CSR has traditionally been applied to profit making and commercial 
corporations. The European Commission defines CSR as “a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission 2011, p. 3). 
With this approach companies act “over and above their legal obligations towards society and 
the environment”, whereby compliance to CSR can be favoured by a conducive regulatory 
environment. The intuition behind this kind of approach is that CSR criteria need to be added 
by means of legal constraints or, more often, through self-regulation by the organization in 
order to improve its competitiveness, social standing,  and to reduce social costs or negative 
external effects deriving from traditional forms of entrepreneurship. The many contributions 
on what management science calls the “triple bottom line” have emphasised that firms can 
produce social and environmental value besides economic value (Elkington, 1998; Crane and 
Matten, 2007). The approach is often contrasted with Milton Friedman (1970) famous stating 
that the responsibility of a business is to maximise shareholder value while conforming to the 
basic rules of the society. The neo-liberal approach considered CSR as a sort of “tax” paid by 
corporations which is aimed at improving public welfare, whilst instead this is the role of the 
state. Unsatisfied with the answer of the neo-liberal approach to the “social costs” created by 
corporate activities, scholars have reasoned on how to nest socially relevant elements within 
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stripped-down commercial objectives. The debate has analysed different evolutionary 
patterns whereby CSR can be the result of exogenous interventions by regulators, as well as 
the endogenous result of self-regulation. For example, social accounting and ethical codes 
represent instances of self-regulation that have the function of fulfilling and communicating 
the firm’s societal role, such as improving the conditions of non-investor stakeholders, and 
producing positive externalities that benefit communities and society at large.  
Operationally, CSR becomes relevant in changing the working of the firm since it affects 
organizational routines. Notably, routines can “store” values, knowledge, and managerial 
models directed to reconcile commercial with social objectives (Jeenbaeva, 2015). Changing 
governance models, however, is a different matter. It requires re-thinking who partakes in the 
fundamental assets of the firm, which is the power to define its aims and strategic direction. 
This is a more radical approach to CSR, as it requires re-thinking who is involved, why, on 
what basis, and to what effects. At a fundamental level, deeper forms of CSR have included 
societal concerns amongst the firm’s objectives and governance solutions. In all cases, still, 
CSR introduces some degree of change, whether at operational (in terms of socially relevant 
working rules and constraints) or more strategic level (in terms of governance and decision 
making processes), (Cf. Sacconi, 2012; Sacconi and Degli Antoni, 2011).  
The challenge of CSR can be interpreted as how to legitimise the integration of broader 
societal interests into economic choices, or “why corporations must fulfil an extended range 
of obligations toward their stakeholders” (Sacconi, 2012, p. 4). Institutional economists, in 
particular, consider what can be called “deep CSR”, that is transformative solutions which 
embed societal interests in firm governance, that is in the rules defining who holds strategic 
control on the firm’s direction and owns residual rights.  
This contribution focuses on forms of CSR of the likes of NPOs, social enterprises, co-
operative firms, employee-owned companies (EOCs) and multi-stakeholder governance. 
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Their common feature is that they all are organizational types which do not maximise profits, 
and add the social dimension in the operation and aims of the organization as fundamental 
elements. The explicit recognition of a social dimension can therefore be studied at different 
levels, starting from basic institutions, such as control rights and governance, up to strategic 
and operational dimensions such as organizational routines, managerial models and 
employment relations. The issue to be examined, in these respects, is how these firms design 
their governance consistently with the instrumental role of profit and other commercial 
objectives, and how the role of profit is reconciled with the main societal aims. We study the 
inclusion of societal elements (the desired “effects”) along three organizational dimensions: 
who decides what to produce, how production decisions are made, and to what effect 
(Bobbio, 1977; cfr also Ostrom, 1990). If we refer to these questions, we can study the 
presence and impact of the social dimension in any firm, under the assumption that the nature 
of governance contributes to determine the nature of aims and, therefore, the firm’s impact.  
Following an explanatory strategy that fits within the framework presented in Borzaga, 
Depedri and Tortia (2014), Figure 1 introduces the analytical framework. We use a 
continuum to illustrate diverse governance models and aims.  The continuum starts from 
governance models that are nearest to investor ownership and profit maximisation, and then 
proceeds farther away towards models that embody various social elements in their 
governance and objectives.  
Figure 1. Governance models and firm objectives 
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Moving from the left-end of the continuum, there are investor-led enterprise models that 
progressively introduced strategies to achieve the creation of multiple impacts, for example 
along the managerial ideas developed around the triple bottom line, emphasising economic, 
social and environmental elements. The main stakeholder remains the investor to which 
management holds a fiduciary duty. Further socio-economic aims are “added” consistently 
with the firm’s ability to maximise the interests of investors. Managerial approaches may 
work to some extent, but consistently with the profit maximising objective. The existence of 
alternative modalities, complementary, points to the fact that the traditional firm and its 
governance form has structural constraints and, despite CSR practices, is not suitable to 
address the variety of interests affected by the firm’s activities. We could in fact see the 
emergence of deeper forms of CSR as an answer to the institutional inadequacy of traditional 
firms to justify CSR. These other forms include changing the nature of the firm’s aims and its 
governance. One way of achieving this is changing the dominant stakeholder or engage 
multiple stakeholders in the governance bodies of the firm (Hansmann 1996; Borzaga and 
Sacchetti, 2015).  
On the right side of the continuum we find socially oriented organizational models. These 
organisations do not pursue commercial objectives in a dominant way. Rather, they add 
social dimensions as fundamental elements in their operations, while commercial objectives 
tend to become instrumental to wider social ones (Borzaga et al., 2014). These are still firms, 
but their social remit implies that surplus capital is in large part reinvested in the community. 
At the extreme right of the spectrum, we find charitable NPOs (NPOs). These cannot be 
called enterprises, as commercial and profit-led objectives give way to dominant social 
objectives. 
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As an illustration of the arguments presented so far, the chapter presents case studies 
completed between 2011 and 2013 in the UK. These include all main non-investor owned 
organisational forms considered in the spectrum: employee-owned companies, co-operative 
enterprises, social enterprises and NPOs. The case studies were aimed at enquiring the 
governance and social role of non-investor owned forms, and can give important insights into 
how such organisations achieve economic and financial equilibrium; as well as solidifying 
their social standing.  They reveal that some of the most common methods include: 
1) Modifying control rights (‘who takes part’ and ‘according to what criteria’)  
2) Including stakeholders in the firm’s control and decision making processes (how 
decisions are made and what resources are shared) 
3) Making societal aims explicit (‘to what expected effects’). 
 
Multistakeholder governance 
One approach to CSR is multi-stakeholder governance. This can be considered the emergent 
result of the institutionalization of CSR criteria, which have been analysed in strategic 
management and business ethics by Freeman (1984) amongst others. The approach 
normatively argues for corporations to share decision making responsibilities with various 
stakeholders. More critically, in law and economics, Blair and Stout (1999) have criticised 
the orthodox approach advocated by Friedman (1970) and Jensen (2001). Instead they argue 
for an extended fiduciary duty of the board of directors, which considers the interests of a 
plurality of stakeholder groups, rather than just those of shareholders.  
Multiple-stakeholders can be embodied into different organizational forms using a variety 
of institutional solutions. These may differ depending on the statutory positions of 
stakeholders and access to strategic control. The German co-determination system represents 
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a model of multi-stakeholder governance in for-profit firms. Representatives of labour and 
capital coexist in the main elective bodies, and have very similar prerogatives in information 
disclosure and decision making processes. Likewise, the Japanese model analysed by Aoki 
(1984) introduces the notion of institutional complementarities. In the Japanese model of 
corporate governance stakeholders constitute the parts of a networked production system and 
share surplus according to their bargaining power.  
Towards the right side of the spectrum firm types are increasingly characterised by 
mutuality and /or social objectives. When organisations are defined by the pursuit of social 
aims, multi-stakeholder governance may be required by regulation. This is the standard in 
community and socially oriented business forms, such as social co-operatives (Co-operative 
Sociali) in Italy, Société Coopérative d'Intérêt Collectif (Scic) in France, community interest 
companies (CIC) and community benefit societies (BenCom) in the UK.1 It can also emerge 
spontaneously, as part of the socially oriented aims of the organisation. 
 
Employee ownership 
Employee ownership (EO) lies formally within investor ownership (IO). However, by 
exclusively assigning share ownership to workers, it represents a radical departure from 
standard IO control rights. This departure is key to introducing a mutual governance form. In 
some EO models, mutual governance is anchored to the number of shares owned by each 
employee while, in others, leans towards classic co-operative governance involving the “one 
employee, one vote” rule. While ownership is attributed to workers as investors, governance 
is modified to assign control rights to workers as members of the organisation. This solution 
																																								 																				
1 BenCom were reformed in 2014 by the Cooperative and Community Benefit Societies Act, which replaced the 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 1965. 
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pairs market profitability with employee protection, mitigating the negative impacts that IO 
can have on employment contracts (Albanese, Navarra and Tortia, 2015).  
The societal function of the organization coincides with the development of progressive 
labour relations, and with the improvement of the economic and moral conditions of workers. 
Albeit limited to workers, the societal function of EO has represented, over the last two 
centuries, a crucial milestone for those social movements advocating democracy and self-
determination in all spheres of human activities, beyond State institutions and intervention. A 
well-known example is represented by the John Lewis Partnership in the United Kingdom, 
one of the largest UK retailers, as well as one of the oldest EOCs in the UK and in Europe 
(Storey, Basterretxea and Salaman, 2014).  
Insofar as it allows for a potential mismatch between ownership and control, EO poses 
important challenges to institutional evolution. For one, the presence of saleable shares and 
potentially contestable ownership can induce distorted incentives and behaviours of 
managers, who can see in firm conversion and sale the easiest route to higher capitalization 
and profits. Case studies suggest that managerial decisions have been taken in these 
organisations with the aim of converting EO firms into IO, when conversion is readily 
available (Erdal, 2011, 2013).  
More generally, even in the absence of this type of managerial decisions, the possibility to 
sell shares can favour or accelerate processes of demutualization, especially in difficult 
economic times, since in the prediction of a downturn it can be convenient for worker 
members to sell their shares before their value is diminished. Evidence from the Spanish 
economy is illustrative of this point. When comparing the behaviour of EO companies 
(Sociedad Laborales) with other organizational forms (worker co-operatives and IO firms) 
during the last six years, results confirm a stronger tendency of EO firms to layoff, reduce 
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dimension and demutualize during a crisis (Tello, 2016). The risk of demutualization can be 
reduced by holding shares in trust funds, this way limiting of excluding saleability, like in the 
John Lewis Partnership case.  
 
Case study: Highland Home Carers (HHC) 
Highland Home Carers (HHC) operates to provide homecare and support services to people 
who suffer from social and health-related forms of impediment. This is an EO company 
located in Inverness, in the Highlands of Scotland. The region consists of many remote areas, 
which makes homecare a major societal need and challenge. The main benefits for users are 
that they can remain in their homes, keep their lifestyle and become more independent (where 
possible). 
HHC is the result of a leveraged buy-out carried out in 2004. The buyout was accomplished 
through the financial support of Baxi, a financial intermediary specialised in conversions 
from IO to EO firms.  Highland Home Carers currently employs 400 people, who produce an 
annual £6 million turnover. 
The study was implemented through one in depth focus group with the founding members, 
managerial staff and operators of the company. This in-depth collective interview allowed to 
listen to different voices as they debated and interacted about the main motivations, 
outcomes, and critical elements of the employee-ownership project.  
What emerged from the focus group is a smooth process of conversion into an EO 
company. The process led to increased financial turnover, expanded employment, more 
limited worker turnover and wider range of services provided, most of them being dependent 
on public procurement contracts and tenders. No specific critical elements emerged in the 
description of the firm operation and organization. Governance is structured around employee 
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control, as each employee is required to hold a significant amount of shares. Only employed 
workers own shares, which are bought back by the organization in the case of quittance, 
retirement or lay-off. An internal market for the shares of the company has been set up, 
whereby each employee can sell part of his or her shares to other employees and to the 
organization itself. Since shares are not priced by financial markets, their price is set 
internally through a yearly process of accounting and evaluation. Even if the ownership of 
shares is not completely levelled (different employees can hold substantially different 
amounts of shares depending on their seniority, income and several other individual 
conditions) the governance of the organization is implemented on a "one employee, one vote" 
basis, which is considered to be the fairest, easiest to implement, least controversial and most 
effective solution.  
The HHC governance structure has clearly been able to solve the allegedly severe failures 
in collective entrepreneurial action, which have been evidenced several times in the economic 
literature, as related especially to free riding (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Ostrom, 1990), 
and to organizational costs due to diverging members’ interests (Hansmann, 1996, 2013; 
Borzaga and Tortia, 2017). The only critical element that emerged during the interview is 
represented by the high financial costs of the leveraged buy-out, which the organization 
predicted to overcome in about ten years.  
The two main motivations backing the transformation from investor to employee ownership 
were:  
1) To improve workers’ autonomy and their involvement in decision-making processes.  
2) To create organisational structures and solutions which would reflect employees’ 
views and understanding concerning care services. In other words, EO would be a more 
suitable organisational model than IO in the production of personal and care services thanks 
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to employee involvement in decision-making and in the production of non-standardized 
services. 
The first motivation benefits workers, while the second contributes to users’ benefit. 
Production organisation, specifically in the provision of home care services, favours the use 
of an EO model because of qualitative and efficiency reasons. In fact, personal care is 
characterised by relatively low capital intensity, whilst featuring high labour intensity and 
relational drive. By reflecting the specific needs and situations of each user, personal services 
are defined by the relation between users and care providers. Given the non-standardised and 
relational nature of personal and social services, work effectiveness has been argued to 
require on-the-job autonomy (Borzaga and Depedri, 2005; Gui, 2000). Likewise, workers are 
large sources of tacit knowledge that accumulates with experience. Economic explanations, 
besides, emphasise that workers’ active participation in production and in decision making 
can resolve asymmetric information and contract incompleteness, since workers are more 
informed than managers about users’ conditions. Workers’ involvement would, therefore, 
deliver improved quality and effectiveness.  For these reasons, employee involvement has 
been judged to have a fundamental role in organizational governance in this sector. 
Overall, results from the HHC case illustrate how CSR can be embedded in governance by 
including workers (“who”). They are employed and own shares in the organisation 
(“according to what criteria”), and participate in production decisions, strategic control and 
economic results (“to partake in what”) as a solution for improving their self-determination 
and the quality of personal and social services (“to what effects”). 
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Case study: Lock Fyne Oysters 
The case of Scottish-based fishing company Loch Fyne Oysters illustrates a less 
successful case of EO, with a double transition experience, from family business to employee 
owned and then to investor-owned company. Loch Fyne Oysters had been the main business 
activity in the Loch Fyne community of Argyll, West coast of Scotland since 1978 when it 
was founded by Johnny Noble and Andy Lane. The principles set by the local founders were 
inspired to environmental values and care for the community. The transition to employee 
ownership that followed the disappearance of the last founding entrepreneur, Johnny Noble, 
was meant to allow for decisions to be shared within the local community. On similar 
communitarian values, his sister, Christina Noble, founded in 2002 the community non-profit 
“Here We Are,” which is analysed later in this Chapter. When John Noble died in 2002 the 
company was sold to its employees. The transition from conventional to EO in 2003 was 
supported again by Baxi, which provided consultancy over the governance transition as well 
as the capital and relevant knowledge for the hundred employee buyout. The transition 
process aimed also at shaping a culture of involvement and deliberation, integrating 
deliberative processes at different levels in the management of the organisation. Our case 
study identified that problems arose at this stage, thus putting the transition in jeopardy. On 
another critical point, with the aim of expanding the business, the management engaged into 
new acquisitions. Interviews evidenced that the indebtedness that followed the acquisition 
process lowered competitiveness as well as the morale of employees which disengaged from 
the idea of shared ownership and responsibilities. Eventually in 2012 the fishing company 
was demutualised with the backing of the 105 employee members in order to clear liabilities 
and keep occupational levels. Soon after the interviews, the new owne became Scottish 
Seafood Investments Ltd, which is controlled by Northern Link Ltd (owning 67 % of the 
shares of Scottish Seafood Investments; Source, Reuters 2012). 
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Co-operative enterprises 
A co-operative firm is an organisation controlled by its members rather than by members of a 
family or by external investors. Co-operatives can take several different forms, such as 
worker-owned, consumer-owned, and user-owned co-operatives (e.g. credit unions in the 
finance sector). Co-operatives can also be formed by small private businesses, such as 
farmers – these are often known as producer-owned co-operatives -, or have public benefit 
objectives. Given that control is based on membership, co-operatives operate in the interest of 
their members, rather than that of external investors. This results in a collective goal derived 
from a mixture of: 
1) individual ‘private benefit’, in that members seek to maximise their own welfare; 
2) collective ‘mutual benefit’, in that the co-operatives aim to enhance the welfare of 
the whole membership (e.g. by seeking fairness in distributing benefits and enabling 
everyone to participate in decision-making processes and partake in the wealth 
produced); 
3) ‘social benefit’ when the co-operative is socially oriented, like in the case of social 
co-operatives in Italy.  
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Table 1. Objectives pursued by different co-operative enterprises.  
Co-operative enterprises  Mutualistic aims 
Worker-owned enterprises Pursue job stability 
Co-operative banks and credit unions Pursue the reduction of credit rationing for 
small businesses 
Consumer co-operatives Aim at better quality and lower prices for 
their products 
Producer co-operatives Aim at gaining fairer prices for their inputs 
 
Co-operative firms are understood as the most classical model of firm that coordinates 
economic activities to achieve mutual benefit by means of collective entrepreneurial action 
(Borzaga and Tortia, 2017). Control is adjudicated to one or several groups (in the case of 
multi-stakeholder co-operatives) of non-investor stakeholders, which represent the 
membership of the organization, on the basis of the "one member, one vote" rule (Birchall, 
2010). Control rights can be assigned to a plurality of groups of non-financial patrons 
(consumer, workers, users, borrowers etc...). In co-operatives, ownership of assets and 
members’ control are not decoupled, but are instead constructed to pursue and protect 
members’ objectives. Two main models of asset ownership have emerged over time. The first 
is diffused in Anglo-Saxon countries. It is characterized by divided or divisible ownership, 
which can be appropriated and cashed in by members when they quit the organization, or 
upon the organization dissolution. The second model, mainly spread in continental Europe, is 
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instead characterized by non-divided, or common ownership (Tortia, 2015). In both models, 
ownership of assets is not conceived as a financial investment whose marketable value is to 
be maximized. Instead, ownership has an instrumental role, which aims at members’ welfare 
in both monetary and non-monetary terms. Authority relations are allowed only in terms of 
delegated decision making power, whereby managers are agents of members, and are 
appointed by an elected board (Borzaga and Tortia, 2017). The self-directed and collective 
nature of governance supports representation in boards and the effective achievement of 
members’ interests (Ostrom, 1990; Hansmann, 2013). 
The social role of co-operatives and the mechanisms that are set out to pursue it are 
embedded in the firm’s institutional structure. Given the non-contracted nature of 
membership rights (Dow, 2003; Birchall, 2010; Ellerman, 2015), co-operatives enjoy better 
chances to internalize in their internal procedures and decisional processes important welfare 
effects, which may not be manageable in the same way by means of contractual relations 
entertained with IOFs. For example, they have been proved to adequately pursue job stability 
in worker co-operatives, the reduction of credit rationing in financial co-operatives and 
banks, and in credit unions; better quality and lower prices of products in consumer co-
operatives; higher prices of inputs in producer co-operatives.     
The objectives of co-operative enterprises are likely to be more complex than in investor 
owned companies. This is because a co-operative needs to reflect different and stratified 
needs and motivations at the same time (Borzaga and Tortia, 2017; Sacchetti and Tortia, 
2016). Similarly to IOFs, the monetary component of the firm objective crucially influences 
firm survival, that is to the long run balance between revenues and costs; and growth, which 
requires sufficiently wide net residuals and investments programs. However, the way in 
which monetary results are conjugated with other objectives still calls for further enquiry. 
Specifically, whether co-operatives purse more general welfare functions is a hypothesis that 
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requires attention. Involvement in decision making, autonomy, procedural and interactional 
fairness can be organizational dimensions which contribute to increase members’ welfare. 
Members may decide to forsake part of their remuneration in exchange for a more agreeable 
organizational environment (Jossa, 2014, 2015). On the other hand, specific additional 
objectives for each individual type of co-operative enterprise can be detected. Worker 
members in worker co-operatives can give a positive weight to the pursuit of job stability 
over and beyond income maximization, which was hypothesized as their dominant objective 
in the classical article by Benjamin Ward (1958). Members of producer co-operatives clearly 
weight in a positive way the possibility to preserve legal and organizational independence, 
and the possibility to retain ownership of their business, and especially of their land in the 
case of agricultural co-operatives (Tortia, Valentinov and Iliopoulos, 2013). Members in 
credit co-operatives aim at reducing credit rationing disfavouring small and medium sized 
enterprises deprived of collateral guarantees (Birchall, 2013). Finally, all typologies of co-
operatives may want to favour the expression of the inner needs of members, such as 
creativity and self-actualization, needs that have been often connected with the realization of 
intrinsic, more than extrinsic motivations (Deci and Ryan, 2000). Heightened complexity in 
the objectives of the organization would testify the different social role of co-operatives 
relative to IOFs. Comparative analysis would be needed in these respects to enquire on 
whether sheer monetary objectives would be in fact substituted by a set of interlocked and 
stratified aims that fulfil multifaceted needs. These aims refer mainly to the individual 
member. Wider societal aims are not explicitly expressed in co-operatives, but neither 
necessarily absent. Some empirical results show positive and strong correlation between 
intrinsic and other-regarding worker motivations, which would translate into the pursuit of 
both individual and social objectives (Depedri, Tortia and Carpita, 2012). Such evidence 
would imply that organizational channels supporting the expression of intrinsic motivations 
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would also support the pursuit of social aims through governance and collective decision 
making processes.        
Still, CSR in co-operatives mainly refers to members’ welfare, which is internal to 
organizational boundaries, but also has positive external effects at the societal level. Some 
authors evidenced the peculiar role of co-operative firms in endogenously driven processes of 
local economic development, pointing out that their local embeddedness, and their 
geographically rooted nature, make them a localised "sunk" asset, which exerts its effects 
locally, benefiting first and foremost local communities (Borzaga and Tortia, 2009). Other 
works have evidenced the potential of co-operatives in social capital creation at the local 
level. The creation of social capital would be fostered by a better relational context 
underpinned by inclusive governance (Sabatini, Modena and Tortia, 2014).  
 
Case study: Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative 
This case study was implemented through two in depth interviews to the founding members 
and managerial staff of the Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative. The first interview was 
conducted at the industrial plant in which bicycles are assembled, the second in the main shop 
in Bruntsfield, Edinburgh.  
The Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative (EBC) was created in 1977 by three cycling experts 
who were passionate about cycling tourism. The co-operative started as a simple repair 
workshop, and slowly became a medium-sized retailer in the bicycle industry, growing to 
around 170 employees in 2012, of whom 135 were members. Turnover reached £12 million 
in 2011, when EBC jointly sold about 20,000 bicycles through its six shops in Scotland and 
Northern England, and through its online shop. Today, EBC is the largest bicycle retailer in 
Scotland and Northern England. Its board is made of six directors, all employed workers 
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elected within the membership, and three executive directors appointed every three years, 
who are themselves part of the membership. Profits are equally distributed through an annual 
bonus. Pay differentials are compressed, as the maximum ratio of the highest to lowest wage 
is five to one.   
EBC mainly operates in the retail sector, as the industrial plant is exclusively used to 
assemble, not to produce, bicycles. Consequently, it is characterised by medium to low 
capital intensity. High capital intensity would be out of its reach given well-known 
difficulties of this kind of enterprise to access financial markets (Podivinsky and Steward, 
2006; Jossa, 2014). The bulk of the capital is held in common funds, even is a share incentive 
plan was introduced in 2010 to strengthen financial involvement. The research interviews 
showed that governance and its bodies work smoothly and do not present critical elements.  
All major decisions concerning members and the co-operative are taken by the general 
assembly on a majority basis, where specialised lawyers are used to work out internal 
regulation and by-laws compatible with national legislation. For example, after 24 years in 
which EBC had a single store in Edinburgh, the decision was taken in 2001 to expand and 
open new stores. This changed members’ perception of the business, since the small 
dimension had favoured direct worker involvement in decision-making and the development 
of close interpersonal relations, which might have not been possible any more in a multi store 
organisation. The decision to expand  was supported in the general assembly by 60% of 
members. 
Societal criteria are reflected in the attention paid to the welfare and involvement of 
worker members. In addition, the co-operative was created on an alternative cultural basis, 
introducing cycling as a form of green counter-narrative to the automobile industry’s rampant 
running in the last decades of twentieth century. Following this approach, self-determination 
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at work is paired with environmentally-oriented preferences. Overall, results illustrate how 
societal aims and effects are embedded in governance solutions by: 
1. Having worker-based governing bodies employed by the organisation (‘who takes 
part’ and ‘according to what criteria’)  
2. Giving worker-members strategic control of production decisions and access to 
economic results (‘to partake in what’)  
3. Improving self-determination at work and the promotion of a greener alternative to 
car mobility and leisure (‘to what effects’). 
 
Social enterprises 
Social enterprises (SEs) represent a relatively new entrepreneurial model, which was initially 
introduced in the UK and Italy in the early 2000s to mark the possibility of pairing 
entrepreneurial action with societal objectives. Since they are defined on the basis of their 
social objective, and differently from traditional forms of co-operative enterprises, the 
presence of a membership of non-investor stakeholders is not a necessary requirement in SEs 
(Borzaga and Galera, 2009). This implies that SEs can take a variety of forms (e.g. 
foundation, co-operative, investor-owned etc.). The social objective is required by law and 
made explicit in the company statute: it has to be recognised either by a national regulatory 
agency (UK) or included in a closed set of sectors, mainly referring to health care, social and 
educational activities (Italy). Community Interest Company is the newest form of SE in the 
UK. Regulations 2005 states that ‘CICs are a new type of limited company for people 
wishing to establish businesses which trade with a social purpose (social enterprises), or to 
carry on other activities for the benefit of the community”’ (CIC Regulator, 2016). In the UK, 
there is not a sectorial limitation to operations, but the CIC Regulator has the ability to accept 
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or reject any application concerning the start-up of a new social enterprise, and decides on the 
basis of the public benefit aim of the activity. In a similar vein, the Italian law no. 118/2005, 
as completed by the legislative decree no. 155/2006, defines social enterprises as: “… private 
organizations, …, that carry out an organized economic activity aiming at the production and 
exchange of goods and services with public benefit, directed to the accomplishment of 
general interest ends, …”. Italian social enterprises cannot be controlled directly or indirectly 
by public bodies and by private for-profit firms. The asset lock is present in the Italian system 
in a very similar way as for the CICs. The preclusion concerns direct distribution to financial 
supporters and members, but also the indirect distribution to other organizations, managers 
and workers. Direct distribution is ascertained when financiers without any control power are 
paid more than the reference interest rate plus 5 percent, while the capital invested by 
controlling stake-holders cannot be remunerated.  
In order to pursue the social objective, private appropriation of net residuals (surplus) 
should be limited or excluded. In the UK and Italy social enterprises can distribute a limited 
amount of residuals in the form of capped, higher than market clearing interest rate. In both 
countries, the SE is required to build indivisible reserves of capital through the imposition of 
the asset lock. Indivisible funds cannot be privately appropriated or directed to mutualistic 
aims, but must serve exclusively the organization social aims (Borzaga and Galera, 2009; 
Borzaga, Depedri and Galera, 2015). If the organization is sold, the value of the asset lock 
cannot be distributed, but has to be conferred to other organizations with a similar nature and 
characterized, in turn, by the presence of the asset lock (e.g. non-profit organizations). 
Given the public benefit objective of the organization, multi-stakeholder governance is 
usually considered integral part of these firms. Involvement in decision making and 
consultation of different stakeholders is usually required, though not necessarily at the level 
of governing bodies (e.g. as directors or auditors). Given the variety of different ways in 
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which SEs can involve their stakeholders, including contracts, the organisation has a duty to 
explain how stakeholders are engaged. For example, the Italian law requires that the SE spells 
out in its statute the ways in which workers and customers are consulted and involved in 
decision making.  
When dealing with SEs, multi-stakeholdership deserves particular attention. It can be 
argued that SEs need active participation of different communities of interest to fulfil their 
social mission equitably. Equitably is used here to mean that stakeholders must partake in 
control as well as in surplus distribution, to which all stakeholders have co-operatively 
contributed (Sacconi, 2012). The exclusion of profit maximisation, the necessity to involve 
different actors in the entrepreneurial venture and in its decision making processes are likely 
to be conducive to pluralistic and isocratic forms of governance (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009; 
Borzaga and Sacchetti, 2015). 
 
Case study: Unity Enterprise 
This case illustrates how a social enterprise used contractual relations to engage with external 
stakeholders, namely public sector, contractors and the contractor’s workers. The case is 
interesting because contracts work to coordinate activities with stakeholders who are in a 
strong position relative to other categories (e.g. disadvantaged workers). Unity Enterprise is a 
Glasgow-based social enterprise with a charitable status. It provides social integration to 
vulnerable people (including long run unemployed) by offering training and job 
opportunities. Starting out as a small enterprise in 1989, with a £3 million turnover, its 
subsequent development was linked to its catering activities attached to the 2014 
Commonwealth Games. This brought on a number of procurement contracts at Glasgow City 
Council, as the Council included Community Benefit Clauses (CBCs) in tenders for the 
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construction of the Games infrastructures. Unity was the first enterprise in Scotland to get 
contracted through a CBC. Their activities also had important media coverage: the enterprise 
was contracted for two years of catering services by McAlpine, the main contractor for the 
National Indoor Sports Arena, and by the Sir Chris Hoy Velodrome in Glasgow.  
The direct impact of this procurement was the employment of seven workers with 
disabilities along with ten additional members of staff. Aside from this, Unity worked with 
site workers (those building the velodrome) to change their perceptions on how to approach 
people with disabilities, and the values and aims of social enterprises. This educational 
initiative reached a thousand workers, and changes in attitude amongst them were visible 
when they ate in the canteen. Workers as well as managers learnt that there was a 
fundamental difference between working in partnership with a social enterprise and merely 
giving money as an act of charity. Following Unity’s success, other catering experiences 
followed in its path.  
The research indicated that the challenge that Unity and social enterprises more generally 
face when entering partnerships with other organisations is the common expectation that a 
social enterprise can bend to meet other organisations’ needs. A former director, pointed out 
that, however, the responsibility of Unity, in this case, was towards the people who would go 
back to unemployment if their business were not sustainable. In this sense the responsibility 
of the social enterprise was identified in learning from profit oriented companies “to 
negotiate with a business mind”, to give continuity and stability to disadvantaged workers. 
Working with a profit oriented contractor, Unity also learned to match economic 
sustainability alongside the social aim. The approach towards keeping “social impact with 
business sense” was used as a benchmark for major decisions, and synthesised by the 
question: “is the business model right to meet the need?” On the other hand, once McAlpine 
learned that training and social integration through work was the main business of Unity, they 
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could collaborate and support Unity decisions on staff, catering operations, and menu 
revision. This mutual learning dynamic between Unity and McAlpine created high levels of 
trust between the two organisations. Public sector organisations also started a learning curve, 
and more Councils introduced CBCs in procurement, which opened the door to other social 
enterprises to deliver social inclusion. 
The project was led to a large extent by the chief executive at Unity. Overall, results 
illustrate how CSR is embedded in the social integration aims of the enterprise and are 
reflected also in a collaborative partnership between a social enterprise and a for-profit 
company; CSR is also promoted by the public sector procurement strategy as a solution for 
integrating economic and social results (“to what effects”). 
 
Non-profit organisations (NPOs) 
Last in our discussion are non-profit organization, whose century long tradition entered 
economic analysis only during the last decades of last century, in the well-known works by 
Weisbrod (1977, 1988) and Hansmann (1988, 1996). NPOs can be broadly sub-divided into 
entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial. The latter category, which includes purely charitable 
and advocative NPOs is not usually included in economic analysis, if not in a marginal way. 
On the other hand, entrepreneurial NPOs received growing attention in the discipline due to 
their growing economic weight (value added produced) employment created and social 
impact.  The ability of entrepreneurial nonprofits to complement and at times substitute 
public sector production of public and merit goods and services was recognized and studied 
by several authors (Becchiega and Borzaga, 2003). Economic analysis of NPOs developed 
following different main lines of enquiry, especially concerning: (i) their economic 
efficiency, as compared to other private organisational forms, and the public sector; (ii) their 
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growth and spread in relation to the presence of different fiscal systems; (iii) the peculiarities 
of their governance, especially as related to the public benefit and social aims pursued; (iv) 
the peculiarities of their managerial models, especially as related to labour relations. This 
growing stream of literature was implicated in the development of broader approaches to 
microeconomics, for example behavioural economics, leading to a wider and more complete 
understanding of human motivations in the economy, the working of economic systems and 
of community development (Rose Ackerman, 1996).  
Economic theory has justified the governance on NPOs on different grounds with respect 
to other forms. Hansmann (1996), in particular, justified the attribution of ownership on the 
basis of an economic calculus that assigns control rights to the stakeholder incurring the 
lowest ratio of costs of governance to costs of contracting relative to all other stakeholders. 
However in the case of non-profits this calculus does not work. In fact, due to strong 
information asymmetries, the stakeholder for whom it is less convenient to rely on a 
contractual relation with the organisation is the weakest stakeholder (as a norm, classes of 
users such as children, elderly people, prisoners, disabled etc.). On the other hand, the weak 
stakeholders are expected to be bad monitors of the activities of managers, if control were 
assigned to them. So here is the dilemma: weak stakeholders cannot coordinate with the 
organisation through contracts because they would bear high costs (e.g. a poor service, higher 
prices), but they cannot control it either since they would not be in a position to monitor 
choices and outcomes. The solution for Hansmann is that NPOs have no ownership and are 
governed by boards of trustees, who agree to act in the best interest of the weak stakeholders.  
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Case study: Here We Are 
Here We Are (HWA) is a rural community centre located in Cairndow, West Scotland. This 
can be considered as a non-profit, inclusive, community-based social enterprise. The small 
community is placed by the picturesque Loch Fyne, with great abundance of water resources 
and fisheries. Having been a prosperous community living off the fishing industry brought by 
Lock Fyne Oysters (an aquaculture/seafood restaurant business), the community went 
through a period of isolation due to population decline and the construction of a new 
motorway, which hid the village from popular routes. HWA was set up, in the words of 
founder Christina Noble, to strengthen the identity of the Cairndow community and to 
“narrow the gap between ‘them and us’” (Linklater, 2015). 
The overall philosophy of the initiative can be described through Christina Noble’s words, 
which we take from HWA 2011 annual report:  
“If we are not aware of our own values, we become victims of other people’s decisions. 
We have to bend to their agenda rather than ours, and that means not just a lack of trust in 
ourselves, but an aversion to risk, and an inability to take decisions of our own.” 
For HWA, this meant providing an answer to the pressures sustained on this small rural 
community. HWA community centre has walls populated by giant posters of old community 
photographs, weddings, houses and classrooms from the past century. Each exhibition is the 
outcome of community engagement projects, during which parts of the community’s identity 
were rediscovered and showcased. These projects are all funded through competitive grants. 
The centre also hosts a computer lab for the community, used as a distance-learning point by 
students from Argyll College and the University of Highlands and Islands, which operate in 
remote areas of Scotland. 
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HWA is governed by a local committee of nine people, including a chair and a secretary. 
In addition to HWA fund-raising and project development, the committee is responsible for 
entrepreneurial renewable energy projects that have been created to achieve economic 
sustainability. Energy schemes are the “trading arm” of the charity. Through the trustees, the 
governance takes a bottom-up approach with the aim of increasing community participation, 
from decisions about projects to their management and execution. The aim of engagement is 
to always create benefits for the community, building on trust, reciprocity, and respect for the 
people, their culture, and the environment. 
Several trusts and foundations supported HWA in the first years. Projects regarded 
community identity and exhibitions were produced on 19th-20th century Highland schools and 
education, on weddings in Cairndow dating back to 1900, on land ownership to show how 
changes affected community prosperity, employment and housing, and on local power 
generation. A cookery book produced at HWA is in every house in Cairndow, albeit it 
contains more than recipes, but rather the personal history of Cairndow’s women who 
contributed their recipes. One of the most ambitious projects was, at the time, the 
reconstruction of the history of 107 Cairndow houses, sponsored by the Heritage Lottery 
Fund. All these projects required the voluntary work of people from the community. 
Anticipating the coming cuts to grants, and to make the organisation sustainable, HWA built 
some infrastructures that generate rents, such as a meeting room, a shop (The Tree Shop) to 
sell outdoor equipment. This however was again supported through grants. To gain further 
independence from grants, HWA then invested in renewable energy, again building on the 
community experience of 18th century water mills. Through supported energy surveys, the 
opportunity to build a biomass heat scheme and a hydro-power scheme emerged. The 
biomass scheme was supported by the demand coming from the local salmon hatchery at 
Lakeland Smolts. In 2008 this exploratory feasibility study led to the creation of a wood 
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chipping plant in the form of a Community Interest Company called “Our Power”, an 
initiative that was shortlisted for Scottish Green Energy Awards “Best Community 
Initiative”. The plant supports energy needs of Loch Fyne Oysters restaurant, HWA centre, 
and the attached shop. The hydro scheme proved more difficult to be implemented. New 
partnerships had to be put in place, creating a joint venture with local hydro developers. The 
biggest challenge was to persuade investors, and at the end of a long and at times 
disappointing process, the Co-operative Bank agreed to fund it and Our Hydro Ltd was 
founded. The foresight of the founder was crucial in pursuing HWA sustainability, which has 
been linked to the two renewable energy companies (one CIC and one Ltd).  
Results highlight that a non-profit organisation such as HWA has had socio-cultural, 
environmental and economic impacts for the community. The social and cultural impact was 
acknowledged by the Scottish Community Foundation which commissioned, in 2008, a 
Social Capital case study and designated HWA a Social Capital Champion. The economic 
impact is manifested in the creation of two the businesses, which bear on the environmental 
impact embodied in the two renewable energy schemes that serve the local community. 
Beyond the community, similar problems in other rural and rather isolated communities were 
making - at the time of the interview - other non-profits to look at HWA and its commercial 
schemes as a model to be followed. This confidence in building self-determination of 
communities into their heritage, social and environmental justice is exemplified by a short 
publication which was put together at HWA “as an introduction to encourage others to set up 
a Here We Are”. 
The main features responsible for generating positive impacts are as follows: 
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• HWA was built with resources intrinsic to Cairndow’s local community in terms of 
social connections and inner trust, on a shared understanding of the community and its 
culture, and on local skills and competences. 
• HWA addressed a variety of social goals simultaneously: increasing societal identity, 
achieving environmental goals through renewable energy schemes, ensuring 
economic sustainability of activities, reinvesting in the community and pursuing local 
cultural needs. 
• Community participation was crucial. 
• The individual initiative and life-experience of the founder was crucial. 
• The capacity to bid for external grants and identify relevant funders amongst the 
trustees. 
• The ability to generate start-ups, or trading arms, to sustain community charitable 
activities. 
• The network of relations with other small communities in northern Europe, and the 
ongoing debate on how transferable initiatives are to communities with similar 
societal challenges. 
Overall, results illustrate how CSR is embedded in governance through a community-
based governing body (“who”) whose members are willing to engage the community in 
constructing and reconstructing the history of the community and in developing a lively rural 
environment for current generations (“according to what criteria”). All community members 
can partake in new project development whose results are shared with the entire community 
(“to partake in what”) as a solution for integrating economic, social and environmental results 
(“to what effects”). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has been devoted to discuss CRS criteria and impact in non-investor owned 
organizations. Illustrations have pointed to the existence of a variety of governance and 
coordination solutions that can face societal challenges, in terms of positive impacts for 
communities and specific stakeholders. Key factors for understanding governance were 
summarised in four questions: who controls production decisions, what criterion is used, what 
do participants partake in, and what are the desired effects of the activity. By understanding 
the answers to these questions, societal impacts of organisations can be to some extent 
anticipated. 
The pattern that emerges from the analysis includes: (i) the shifting of control rights from 
investor to non-investor stakeholders, either in the form of mutual benefit control rights in co-
operative enterprises and in EOCs, or in the form of collaborative partnerships and multi-
stakeholder governance in social enterprises; (ii) the progressive introduction in governance 
and in contracts of private and social objectives that are not purely monetary. These can be 
the mutual benefit for members in co-operatives, and EOCs, or social in social enterprises 
and NPOs; (iii) the new role of surpluses, as means to mutualistic or social ends, through the 
introduction of a partial or complete non-profit constraint, and of the asset lock, which is 
observed in some models of co-operative and social enterprises, while it is instead mandatory 
in NPOs.  
Case studies of organisations that embody these features offer insights on the institutional 
mechanisms and governance solutions through which purely monetary aims are overcome, or 
integrated and nested within wider individual, organisational and social objectives. The 
studies, in particular, illustrate how CSR criteria are introduced and internalized using 
coordination mechanisms offered by governance (Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative; Highland 
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Homecarers), complemented by contractual tools (Unity Enterprise) and social capital 
(HWA). The case of Lock Fine Oysters, indicates that management’s pursuit of growth and 
poor monitoring from worker-members can lead to alienation of control rights and ownership 
to investors. Given the complexity of this process of institutional evolution, this chapter 
cannot but represent an introduction based on instances, whose development requires careful 
assessment of central issues characterising the relationship between governance and societal 
outcomes. Case studies cannot have general validity, but helped formulating relevant 
hypotheses and paving the way to future research.  
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